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Humpty Dumpty was Wrong - Consistency in Meaning Matters:  
Some Definitions of Privacy, Publicity, Secrecy and other Family
Members1
Gary T. Marx
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, 
“it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.”
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so 
many different things.”
“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master – 
that’s all.”
- Lewis Carroll Through the Looking Glass
Humpty Dumpty was partially right. His words may mean what 
he chooses to have them mean, but that is just his story.2 There is 
nothing inherent or eternal in the words (or what they represent). 
Granted that he has the power to say what he means, but others have 
the power to say what they mean, not to mention hearing what they 
choose to hear. Alice is the more interesting of the two when she 
wonders what the consequences are of making "words mean so many 
different things." For the understanding of secrecy and related 
phenomena those consequences are decidedly negative.
In the beginning there was the concept. And in beginning an 
inquiry into surveillance (Marx 2015), I argue that the failure to 
1
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adequately define and differentiate terms can cloud and contort ethical
and empirical understanding and lead to unnecessary conflict and 
unwise policies. Consider surveillance and privacy, terms central to 
understanding secrecy. What "are" they really? (Or better what do 
people mean when they use the terms)?
In popular and academic dialogue surveillance is often wrongly 
seen to be only the opposite of privacy—the former is seen as bad and
the latter good. For example, social psychologist Peter Kelvin (1973) 
emphasized privacy as a nullification mechanism for surveillance. But 
Kelvin’s assertion needs to be seen as only one of four basic empirical 
connections between privacy and surveillance. Surveillance is not 
necessarily the dark side of the social dimension of privacy.3
Surveillance implies an agent who accesses personal data (whether 
through discovery tools, rules, or physical and logistical settings). 
Privacy, in contrast, involves a subject who can restrict access to 
personal data through related means.  But both can be connected in a 
variety of ways.
Surveillance can obviously invade privacy—that’s what the fuss 
is all about (e.g., the employee in a lab testing for AIDS who sold 
information on positive results to a mortuary). Yet surveillance can 
also be the means of protecting privacy (biometric identification and 
audit trails, video cameras that film those with access to sensitive 
2
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data). And privacy can also protect surveillance (undercover police 
who use fake IDs and call forwarding to protect their identity) just as it
can nullify it (e.g., encryption, whispering, and disguises). Privacy for 
whom and surveillance of whom and by whom and for what reasons 
need to be specified.
Depending on how it is used, active surveillance can affect the 
presence of privacy and/or publicity. As nouns, the latter can be seen 
as polar ends of a continuum involving rules about withholding and 
disclosing, and seeking or not seeking, information. Thus, depending 
on the context and role played, individuals or groups may be required 
to engage, find it optional to engage, or be prohibited from engaging 
in these activities, whether as subjects or agents of surveillance and 
communication
The rules applying to agents and subjects are in principle 
independent. When the rules specify that a surveillance agent is not to
ask certain questions of (or about) a person and the subject has 
discretion about what to reveal, we can speak of privacy norms. When 
the rules specify that the subject must reveal the information or the 
agent must seek it, we can speak of publicity norms (or, better 
perhaps, disclosure norms). With publicity norms there is no right to 
personal privacy that tells the agent not to seek information, or that 
gives the subject discretion regarding revelation. Rather there is the 
3
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reverse—the subject has an obligation to reveal and/or the agent to 
discover.4
Private and Public as Adjectives
The moral expectations surrounding information as a normative 
phenomenon (whether for protection or revelation and whether based 
on law, policy, or custom) can be differentiated from the empirical 
status of the information as known or unknown. To understand this 
distinction, we need the related terms private and public—adjectives 
that can tell us about the status of information. Is information known 
or unknown; does it have an objective quality; can it be relatively 
easily measured? For example, in face-to face-encounters one 
generally knows the gender and face of a stranger, whether this is in 
the street, an office, or a home. The information is “public,” as in 
readily accessible, and this may be supported by antimask laws and 
requirements to wear symbolic items of clothing, tattoos, or badges. 
Absent such rules, the stranger’s political or religious beliefs are likely 
to be invisible and unknown.
Of course, normative expectations of privacy and publicity do not
always correspond to how the adjectives public and private are applied
to empirical facts. Thus, the cell phone conversations of politicians and
celebrities that have privacy protections may become public. 
4
Secrecy and Society, Vol. 1, No. 1 [2016], Art. 3
https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol1/iss1/3
Information subjected to publicity requirements, such as government 
and corporate reports and disclosure statements, may be withheld, 
destroyed, or falsified. Information not entitled to privacy protections, 
such as child or spouse abuse, may be unknown because of the 
inaccessibility of the home to broader visibility. The distinction here 
calls for empirical analysis of the variation in the fit between the rules 
about information and what actually happens to it.
In consideration of the role of borders below, I note that privacy 
and publicity can be thought of in literal and metaphorical spatial 
terms involving invisibility and visibility and inaccessibility and 
accessibility. The privacy offered by a closed door or a wall and that 
offered by an encrypted e-mail message share information restriction, 
even as they differ in many other ways. Internet forums are not 
geographically localized but in their accessibility can be usefully 
thought of as public places, not unlike the traditional public square, 
where exchanges with others are possible or where others are visible, 
as with an uncovered window. 
Those who make claims about privacy would be more likely to 
agree with one another, or at least be clearer in their arguments, if 
they clarified whether they were talking about respect for the rules 
protecting privacy or the empirical status of information as known or 
not known. 
5
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All concepts are of course limited, if not necessarily always 
scandalous. Erving Goffman (1971). In writing of “relations in public” 
and “public life,” attends to the elements and possibilities within the 
immediacy of physical co-presence (that is in the presence of another 
person). This is the strand of “publicness” as visibility. It suggests the 
“public” as known to at least one other person rather than to any rules
about the status of information (that it must be revealed or concealed)
or to a legally defined place (such as private golf course). So he/we 
can paradoxically speak of “public order in private places” (Goffman 
1971, xiv)
Such visceral immediacy sets up a nice comparative issue as a 
cousin of the distanced immediacy we have come to know—love and 
hate—through the Internet, cell phone, and webcam. It also alerts us 
to the neglected theme of private order and disorder (one form being 
privacy violations) in public places. Erving Goffman captures the 
former with his felicitous phrase civil inattention. For example, when 
passing another person we do not know on the street, some minimal 
glance is necessary in order not to collide and perhaps to acknowledge
the other’s presence. 5The other is “available” for a more indelicate 
personal border crossing, but it does not occur. When it does occur, 
whether as a result of staring, leering or inappropriate speech, 
gestures or touch we have an instance of uncivil attention (Gardner 
6
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1995)
Confidentiality and Secrecy
Surveillance takes place in the context of rules, expectations, 
and practices regarding publicity and privacy. Privacy and publicity and
secrecy and confidentiality are inherently social terms. The terms 
would be irrelevant to Robinson Crusoe when he thought he was alone 
on the island. They are social in implying an “other” from whom 
information is withheld or to whom it is communicated and who may, 
or may not, be under equivalent expectations to reveal and conceal. 
This section examines the interrelationships of rules regarding secrecy 
and confidentiality and helps clarify their meaning.
Confidentiality refers to rules about how discovered information 
is to be treated. It necessitates at least two parties and calls attention 
to social interaction and the rules and expectations that enshroud it. 
For confidentiality to be honored as a practical matter, a second party 
must have obtained the information. For example, once a doctor 
appropriately has personal information about a patient, the 
information is no longer “private” from the doctor. We can’t speak of 
the doctor’s invading the privacy of the patient through routine data 
collection (assuming other unrelated borders are honored). We can 
however speak of a violation of the rules of confidentiality if the doctor
7
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wrongly shares the information or does not adequately protect it.
The information can be viewed as a shared secret, even though 
the prohibition on revelation (except under approved conditions) 
applies only to the surveillance agent (the doctor). This contrasts with 
settings where secrecy and revelation are reciprocal obligations, as 
with nondisclosure clauses in some contractual relations or court 
settlements.6 When the interests of the parties overlap, the 
information is more likely to remain secret.7
Some analysts draw a distinction between secrecy and privacy. 
Privacy is used to mean shielding legitimate, non-stigmatizing 
information, while secrecy “implies the concealment of something 
which is negatively valued by the excluded audience and, in some 
instances, by the perpetrator as well” (Warren and Laslett 1977).8 This
definition of secrecy slaps a negative value on protected information. 
Such information may also be positively valued or neutral. A broader 
definition that does not start with the negative is needed.
To be sure, the nature and properties of any piece of information
suggest an important set of variables. As noted, this discussion is 
particularly concerned with personal information, as against that about
organizations or the physical world. The kind of information withheld 
by, revealed by, or taken from an individual is significant. Is it 
stigmatizing, morally disvalued, disadvantageous; morally and socially 
8
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neutral; or prestige enhancing, morally valued, and advantageous? 
The organization and dynamics of information control (whether to 
discover or communicate/publicize information or to block these) of 
course will differ depending on the kind of information.
The motives and related goals for protecting, discovering, and 
communicating personal information are certainly important. Thus, it is
useful to differentiate information that others do not know according to
the degree of intentionality found with the withholding and the relative
importance the individual places on controlling the information. When 
the non-revelation of the secret is associated with “something to hide” 
(either as stigma or non-stigmatizing information that would 
disadvantage), we see greater intentionality than in situations where 
the unavailability or withholding of information flows from a sense of 
propriety or natural conditions such as limits on the senses.
By convention, the term secrecy often refers to organizational 
data, while privacy refers to the data of individuals. Since 
organizations do not generally have “rights” in the same sense that 
individuals do, secrecy is a better term here than privacy. This may 
involve legitimate organizational secrets, as with patent details and 
strategic plans, or illegitimate organizational secrets, as with false 
reporting and cover-ups. The rules around organizational information, 
as with those around personal information, vary from mandatory 
9
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disclosures to closures with a large discretionary middle area. 9
However, apart from legal meanings, many of the information-
control processes are the same regardless of whether we are dealing 
with organizations or individuals. What is fundamental is the issue of 
information control. There is no compelling reason to call the 
protection of negative information secrecy and its opposite privacy. 
Whether as noun, adjective, or verb, the meanings of secret and 
secrecy overlap those of privacy and private. When personal privacy is 
viewed as a right, it calls attention to the subject’s ability to control 
the release of information. This does not mean it cannot be shared, 
but that the individual has a choice. The Fifth Amendment, for 
example, does not prohibit individuals from offering information or 
confessing, it simply prohibits this from being coercively obtained.
In contrast, the rules applying to legitimate secrecy prohibit or 
limit the subject from releasing information. This is often accompanied 
by sanctions for violation. In principle, individuals and organizations 
don’t have a choice about divulging information deemed to be secret 
by formal rules. Thus, the broader terms protected and unprotected 
information can be used to include both privacy and secrecy and their 
opposites,10 whether this refers to the rules about the information or 
its current empirical status.  
Types of Privacy 
10
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Privacy, like the weather, is much discussed, little understood, 
and not easy to control. Like its family member surveillance, it is a 
multidimensional concept with fluid and often ill-defined, contested, 
and negotiated contours, dependent on the context and culture. The 
scholarly effort to define privacy is a growth industry. Yet as welcome 
as deductive conceptual efforts regarding the meaning of privacy are, 
they must be approached deftly lest they end in reification and 
nominalism gone wild. I prefer to begin with empirical topics that are 
intellectually and socially compelling and to inductively generate 
concepts from them.
For our purposes, the central factors are the rules and conditions
affecting data outputs from and inputs to the person. These rules and 
conditions encounter and may create or overcome borders around the 
person—whether natural or cultural. As noted, I use the term data or 
information to broadly refer to various sensory phenomena that may 
cross the borders of the person (whether leaving or entering) or 
otherwise be associated with the person.
Contemporary concerns almost always involve some aspect of 
informational privacy, a form early identified by Westin (1967). I don’t 
wish to enter the debate over what privacy “really” is in some 
essentialist pre-social sense. But I will note how a sociology-of-
information approach connects to themes in the literature. Within 
11
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informational privacy we find the conditions of anonymity and pseudo-
anonymity, often referred to as being necessary for another type of 
privacy involving seclusion and being left alone. Personal borders are 
obviously more difficult to cross if an individual cannot be reached via 
name or location. The conditions around revelation or protection of 
various aspects of identity are central to our topic.
Informational privacy encompasses physical privacy. The latter 
can refer to insulation resulting from natural conditions such as walls, 
darkness, distance, skin, clothes, and facial expression. These can 
block or limit outputs and inputs. Bodily privacy is one form of this, 
and its borders can be crossed by implanting something such as a chip
or birth control device or removing something, such as tissue, fluid, or 
a bullet.11
A related and taken-for-granted form is aesthetic privacy (Rule 
et al, 1983), which refers to the separation, usually by a physical 
barrier of bedroom or bathroom, of activities involving one’s “private 
parts” and unguarded moments. Alderman and Kennedy (1995) 
discuss a number of such cases in which the shock of discovering a 
violation surfaces norms of which we are hardly aware because they 
are so rarely violated. Clothes and manners also sustain aesthetic 
privacy. The concern over full-body airport scans also illustrates a 
violation or breach of such norms.
12
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Informational privacy can be considered as it ties to institutional 
setting (e.g., financial, educational, health, welfare, employment, 
criminal justice, national security, voting, census); places and times; 
the kind of data involved, such as about religion or health, apart from 
the setting; participant roles (communications privacy as involving 
two-party, one-party, or no-party consent); and aspects of technology,
such as wire or wireless, phone, computer, radio, or TV. 
Considerations of setting, data type, and means are central to 
legislation and regulation and rich in anomalies and cross-cultural 
differences.
In emphasizing informational privacy, several other commonly 
considered forms such as decisional (Decew 1997) or proprietary 
(Allen 2007) privacy are slighted.12 Breaches of these forms primarily 
involve application or use of private information, rather than 
information discovery. Although it is distinct, informational privacy 
shares with the other forms the key factor of control over access to the
person or at least the person’s data. These may be connected. Thus, if
individuals can control their personal information—whether not having 
to reveal their purchase of birth control pills (when this was illegal) or 
keeping paparazzi from taking pictures—then they need not worry 
about that information’s being used. 
Borders
13
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When you are heading for the border Lord
You’re bound to cross the line.
- Kris Kristofferson, “Border Lord”
Much of human history can be read as a struggle involving the 
access to and symbolism implied by various kinds of spatial and 
metaphorical borders. The intersection and blurring of the borders of 
personal information and technology under conditions of modernization
and globalization are central to the topic.13 When surveillance and 
communication technology are controversial, it is often because of the 
crossing, or the failure to cross, a personal border, or because border 
definitions conflict. 
Various borders may protect information: physical blockages 
such as walls, a purse, or skin; kinds of places or organizations as 
culturally defined, such as a home, a church, or a public park; kinds of
role relationships, such as professional and familial; and various 
temporal forms, such as time after working hours, leisure time, 
holidays, and amnesty periods.
Various images can be applied. We can think of borders around 
the person as being like a bubble, clear, frosted, or opaque and 
hermetically sealed or permeable—and for the last, whether permitting
outputs, inputs, or both. With the piercing abilities of the new 
surveillance, speaking of the borderless person (or even organization 
14
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or nation may become less of an oxymoron.
The idea of borders suggests a circumscribed entity (in this case,
the person) separate from its environment. Yet borders to varying 
degrees permit exchanges or, as they say, “flows.” This quality alerts 
us to the important and neglected issue regarding the directionality of 
border crossings. Borders, like roads, are navigable in several 
directions.
Technologies that cross personal borders can be differentiated 
based on the direction of the crossing and data flow. These issues tie 
to sociology-of-information questions regarding norms about 
concealing and revealing information. Here violations may occur on the
part of both the surveillance agent and the person of interest, in either
failing to collect or offer information. An example of the former would 
be an agent’s failure to collect vital information from expectant 
mothers such as about drug use (Etzioni 1999) or inquiring about 
arrest history for persons working with children. Examples of the latter
would be a subject’s failure to reveal such as a house seller concealing 
a leaky roof or a person with a sexually transmitted disease not 
informing a partner of this. Most academics and activists emphasize 
the involuntary collecting of personal information by agents while 
generally giving little attention to the failure to surveil or of subjects to
‘fess up.
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However, considerations of privacy need to focus on more than 
only taking from the person or failing to do so or the failure to reveal. 
Crossing a personal border to impose upon the person is of equal 
importance in considerations of liberty and in the generation of a broad
and logical conceptual framework. Consider, for example, smells sent 
through a heating or air-conditioning system intended to affect moods 
or telephone solicitations, spam and regular junk mail or the 
bombarding of messages in some supermarkets over the PA system or
written on the floor, shopping carts, and neon signs. Or consider 
individuals who offer information inappropriately, as with public nudity,
loud music, or revelation of intimate life details to strangers. 
Surveillance and Communication
The function of borders as either containing those within or rejecting 
those outside (or both) is being changed by new surveillance and 
communication technologies. The spread of sensors and their weaving 
into data networks especially calls attention to the connections 
between undifferentiated and differentiated forms of communication 
and surveillance. These technologies may be mass or individually 
based and involve extraction or imposition functions.
In most considerations of individual privacy, the emphasis is on 
the extent to which the individual can, in principle and in actuality, 
control data from flowing outward, such as that involving telephone or 
16
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computer communication, credit card activity, social networks, beliefs 
and feelings, location, facial appearance, or biometric data such as 
DNA, voice print, heat, and scent. When such outputs are available, 
the individual is a transmitter of data, and something is taken from or 
willingly leaves the person.14 This transmission may happen in an 
active or passive fashion and with or without the individual’s 
knowledge and consent.
Much less attention is directed to the individual’s control over 
information and stimuli flowing inward, such as sound, sight, smell, 
touch, taste, and factors affecting the ability to act (the hard 
engineering in or out of behavior potentials) and even “cookies” placed
on one’s computer by web sites visited. Here the individual is a 
potential recipient of information and related inputs, opportunities, and
restrictions from outside. These in a sense enter rather than leave the 
person, or at least the person’s environment.15
While we are often happy magnets for such exterior inputs, 
much energy also goes into constructing and sustaining barriers to 
unwanted communication forms, such as advertisements (the TV mute
button, DVR), spam, telemarketing, and junk mail (“do not contact” 
lists, call restriction devices), outside noise (headsets), and wearing 
hats, dark glasses, and even masks in public. Such inputs also extend 
to the unwanted communication from loud cell phone users in public 
17
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places. In such cases we see the desire to be left alone and for “space”
and distance, or at least insulation from others.
The same technology may of course offer outputs and inputs.16 
What surveillance takes from the individual can be joined with a 
reverse flow of communication imposed upon the individual. The 
telescreeen in George Orwell’s novel 1984 illustrates this. It 
transmitted the person’s image and words to Big Brother, while 
simultaneously broadcasting propaganda.
Foucault (1977) observed the move away from the spectacle of 
irregular public executions as control mechanisms intended to instill 
fear in the audience to softer punishment hidden and controlled within 
institutions. The systematic use of supposedly scientific knowledge and
less visible surveillance were thought to be more effective and 
humane. Yet with developments in mass communication and the 
strengthening of the First Amendment, public access to information is 
strong and may be getting stronger. We see not only the few watching
the many, but the many watching the few, sharing the same logic of 
visibility intended to bring deterrence and accountability. The news 
entertains and also brings morality tales and symbolic meanings 
(Altheide 2002; Andrejevic 2007; Doyle 2003; Leman-Langlois 2002; 
Mathiesen 1997). Entertainment in the form of sitcoms, music videos, 
and video games brings the news and morality tales.
18
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In the year 1984, Jim Rule observed that with the development 
of computing, mass surveillance became possible alongside mass 
communication. In its indiscriminate sweep, the mass surveillance of 
generalized computer matching (in which the two or more entire 
databases are compared absent reason for specific suspicion) is 
equivalent to the indiscriminate mass transmission of a TV or radio 
signal.
Beyond being mass (broadly) directed, as with TV ads or video 
cameras on roads, communication and surveillance may be focused 
with varying degrees of specificity on individual subjects of interest, as
with targeted marketing and court-ordered wiretaps. This distinction 
(mass or individual focus) is considered in Chapter 2 of my book 
Window Into the Soul mentioned above.. Here let us simply note some
links and some blurring between the two.
We increasingly see tools such as video and computer 
technologies that combine surveillance and communication functions 
or blur the line between them. With this comes a move from mass to 
more individualized communication determined by characteristics of 
the recipient. Moreover, developments in the surveillance of 
consumption have been a major boost to targeted forms of 
communication.
Individualized (targeted or segmented) marketing 
19
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communication often occurs as a result of some form of surveillance. 
Calls to an 800 number, visits to a web page, or consumption behavior
can lead to spam or targeted solicitations via telephone and mail. Law 
enforcement also uses mass communications such as advertisements 
and mailed solicitations to identify potential offenders (those who 
respond), who may then become subjects of stings and other forms of 
surveillance.
Contemporary television and webcam transmissions also 
combine or blur the line between surveillance and communication. 
Consider live helicopter videos of car chases, as with O. J. Simpson, or
investigative TV programs that use infiltration and stings to uncover 
consumer fraud and sexual predation. In these cases, the surveillance 
function is seen as a means for the collection of evidence, as an aide 
to apprehension of violators, and as an affirmation of cultural beliefs 
about what happens to them. This line blurring is also seen with home 
cable TV systems that beyond offering entertainment can monitor 
viewer behavior for billing, marketing, and security. In the case of the 
latter they can monitor for fire, gases, functioning of electrical and 
other systems, unauthorized entry or motion, and internal images of 
the home when an alarm is triggered.
The same tool of course may serve different functions for various
groups. Webcam transmissions such as those in bars or on beaches 
20
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that offer images of swimmers and weather conditions also serve as 
means of communication and control. Automobile radios deliver music 
and emergency messages (the latter even if the radio is turned off), 
and electronic location and engine monitoring devices can control 
driving behavior while also offering safety warnings. Multifunction 
handheld devices that offer radio and television can receive and 
transmit personal messages and images, while also offering records of 
location and communication usage.
In summary, communication and surveillance may be mass 
(broadly) directed, as with TV ads and video cameras in a public 
square. Or they may be individually focused with varying degrees of 
specificity on subjects of interest, as with marketing to particular 
demographic groups and air travel profiling. Technical and social 
developments have strengthened both forms, the linkages between 
them, and their merging.
Greater attention to the non-self evident meaning of the 
common sense terms this article has discussed hardly guarantees wise
public policies with respect to the information control issues so central 
to a democratic society, but it is surely a necessary condition.
21
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1  This article draws from Marx, Windows into the Soul: Surveillance and Society in an Age of 
High Technology (2016c) and other works (2015; 2016a; 2016b).
2  With apologies to the immortal lines of the Dude in the film The Big Lebowski "that’s just like, 
your opinion, man."
3  The noun surveillance and the verb to surveil are the same figures of speech as privacy and to 
privatize. The latter, however, have their opposites in publicity and to publicize. But where are 
the equivalent opposites for surveillance as a noun and a verb? In English there is no easy term
for the action which is the opposite of surveillance.  The verb form to surveil suggests actively 
surveying by an agent, just as the verb form to privatize suggests actively protecting (although
the more common usage involves property rights, as with privatization). While publicize is the 
opposite of privatize, the best-worst term we have for a potential surveillance agent who 
doesn’t act is that he or she demonstrates anti- or non-surveillance or perhaps un-observance. 
The agent chooses not to act or to know (as with the proverbial three monkeys).
4  Marx (2011) analyzes the four types.
5  However sometimes the inattention is feigned as with the so-called brush pass in which two 
people who appear to be simply brushing past each other are handing off spy material in the 
best tradecraft tradition.
6  Contrast this with various other patterns, such as those of non-confidentiality, where both can 
or must reveal, or where the surveillance subject also is expected not to reveal. The presence 
or absence of reciprocity and prohibitions or prescriptions on discovering and reporting are 
important variables in structuring and judging surveillance settings.
7  This suggests another typology of not only who the rules apply to, but of whether the interests
of the parties to the secret are shared or conflicting. Consider the secrecy sustaining elements 
of those having affairs, involved in conspiracies, and the reluctant symbiosis of players in the 
game of blackmail, as against situations where the parties have non-overlapping interests in 
revelation and concealment.
8  For this view we can blame Georg Simmel: “The secret is . . . the sociological expression of 
moral madness” (1950, 331). While Simmel is the classical theorist I would most like to meet if
had I to write about that for an SAT essay test, he missed it here. Marx and Muschert (2008) 
and Coll (2012) argue for Simmel’s continuing relevance a century later, particularly with 
respect to secrecy and information control, new forms of sociation and information as a new 
medium of exchange.  
9  Scheppele (1988) offers a useful conceptualization in noting secrets may be direct (A withholds
from B), serial (A shares the secret with B but withholds it from C)  or collective (A and B 
create a secret that they jointly withhold from C). For these three structures there are two 
choices -- to tell or not to tell. This leads to six types of secret based on the parties involved 
and whether the information is revealed or concealed ((disclosure, betrayal, leaks, simple 
secrets, secondhand secrets, and conspiracy). A further distinction involves whether or not the 
target of the secret suspects that there might be a secret. In that case we find shallow secrets.
Deep secrets refer to cases where the subject does not imagine that relevant information might
be had. Making such distinctions can improve the asking of research questions and judging the 
morality of information concealing and revealing.
10  For the word private the opposite is public but what is it for secret (non-secret) and what does 
the lack of an equivalent term imply?
11  The physical border perspective has limits too, thus taking or giving a urine or breath sample 
or a photo involves using things that have already left the body and are different and beyond 
the literal physical protective border of it. Garbage placed on the street in a protective 
container is physically (although not impossibly) bordered as well, and in some jurisdictions is 
also legally bordered. 
12  Defining cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 11 (1973), involve decisional privacy with respect to personal and intimate matters such 
as family planning, birth control, same-sex marriages, or physician-assisted suicide. Proprietary
privacy—use of a person’s information without consent for commercial and other purposes—
also involves control and liberty questions and the extension of market principles to symbolic 
material that is often immaterial (at least physically). Drawing on, but going beyond these 
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types, Jaap et al offers a comparative analysis of privacy that combines the two variables 
(constitutional principles involving freedom from and freedom to and behavioral zones involving
the personal and the public to yield eight basic types of privacy (bodily, intellectual, spatial, 
decisional, communicational, associational, proprietary, and behavioral privacy), with an 
overlay of a ninth type (informational privacy) overlapping but not coinciding the others.  
Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2754043
13  In Marx (1997, 2001, and 2005b) some blurred forms considered are space, distance, 
darkness, time, and social and cultural orders.
14  The largest category is probably residual, in which there are no rules (although there may be 
softer expectations). What is the ratio of rules that prohibit revelation, as with public nudity or 
nursing, to those that mandate revelation, as with the obligation of sellers of a car or home to 
come clean, and what are the ratios for prohibiting or requiring asking for information?
15  These distinctions can get hazy and be sequentially linked. Consider implants which enter the 
person but can then send data back from the person under external or internal triggering as 
with an RFID chip or bombarding a person with stimuli and then “reading” the response, as 
with one of the MRI brain techniques.
16  Vance Packard was prescient here in writing about both taking information from and imposing 
it upon the individual, although the dates (1964 and 1957) of his publications reverse this 
logical sequence. Goals do not seem to have changed, even as the tools have changed. 
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